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Reframing Law’s Domain: Narrative, 
Rhetoric, and the Forms of Legal Rules
ABSTRACT: Legal scholars typically understand law as a system of determinate 
rules grounded in logic. And in the public sphere, textualist judges and others often 
claim that judges should not “make” law, arguing instead that a judge’s role is simply to 
find the meaning inherent in law’s language. This essay offers a different understand-
ing of both the structure of legal rules and the role of judges. Building on Caroline 
Levine’s claim that texts have multiple ordering principles, the essay argues that legal 
rules simultaneously have three overlapping forms, none of which is dominant: not 
only the form of conditional, “if-then” logic, but also that of a rhetorical situation (as 
Lloyd Bitzer defines it) and a stock story, in which the story’s elements are reduced to 
classes of things, acts, and circumstances. As a result, lawyers must tell stories, and le-
gal decisions are a complex act of categorization in which a judge must decide whether 
the story before the court fits within the category of stories defined by the governing 
legal rule. This essay further suggests that if storytelling is inherent in law and legal 
practice, then legal textualism is flawed because it ignores both actual authors and 
actual audiences. In a very real sense judges do make law, and law’s legitimacy in a 
modern democracy depends on a judge’s willingness to consider the divergent voices 
of those who write the rules and who are bound by or benefit from them.
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I
In law, as in literature, “the narratives of the world are numberless” (Barthes 79). 
While drafting a contract, transactional lawyers engage in speculative fiction, imag-
ining possible plotlines and devising suitable endings. Similarly, litigation is noth-
ing if not a trial by story, in which a jury must weigh competing stories to arrive at 
something like “truth”—though verisimilitude, as delineated by Todorov, might more 
accurately describe what they find.
On a deeper level, and within the public sphere, politicians and the public tell 
stories about law’s legitimacy in a modern democracy. As Guyora Binder and Robert 
Weisberg explain, “some narrative of legitimation is implied in the very ideas of legal 
authority, legal system, and the state” (261). Efforts to justify the rule of law necessar-
ily take the form of a story, in which the narrator defends our collective consent to 
be governed by legal institutions. The theme of many such stories is that law should 
be mimetic, that it should represent the will of society rather than constructing or 
changing it (Binder 105–7).
The stories we tell about judges are vital to that discourse, and in recent decades 
a stock villain has emerged: the “activist judge,” a judge who supposedly oversteps 
their role by making law rather than applying it. For many political conservatives, the 
heroic counterpart is a judge who adheres to legal textualism. Charged with interpret-
ing a statute or constitution, a textualist judge will rely on the text itself, attempting 
to determine how a “skilled, objectively reasonable user of words” would understand 
the text in context (Easterbrook 65).
The textualist view is rooted in legal formalism, which holds that “law is an 
internally consistent and logical body of rules,” a system “independent from the 
variable forms” of the social institutions in which it is situated (Deflem 98). And 
legal formalism, in turn, is deeply antagonistic to stories. Peter Brooks observes that 
narrative analysis “would seem to be almost as relevant as economic or social theory 
to understanding how cases come to the law and are settled by the law” (“Narrative 
Transactions” 3). And yet law tries “to deny the importance of story, to tame it by legal 
rule, to interrupt it by cross-questioning, to suppress it through the equation of story 
with the emotional, the irrational, the dangerous wild card in a discourse committed 
to reason and syllogism” (Brooks, “Literature” 360).
And so one scholar suggests that legal stories are marked by “failures of integrity 
and judgment” (Tushnet 251). Another argues that legal stories “distort reality” by 
imposing a false narrative order on situations “filled with coincidences, randomness, 
and illogic” (Dershowitz 100, 103). And though Catharine A. MacKinnon identifies 
herself as a storyteller, she concedes that storytelling may invite judges and juries to 
suspend their critical faculties. “Lies,” she admits, “are the ultimate risk of storytelling 
as method” (235).
Notwithstanding these attacks, many scholars recognize that narrative and law 
are “mutually inherent” (Binder and Weisberg 261). Binder and Weisberg suggest 
that “some of the most basic patterns of thought in law appear to be narratively 
structured” (264). And in Robert Cover’s view, “law and narrative are inseparably 
related,” because every legal prescription demands “to be located in discourse,” while 
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every legal narrative demands a “prescriptive point” (5). As Linda Edwards explains, 
narrative “provides the frame through which we see all legal issues and within which 
all our discourse occurs” (179). But the relationship between law and storytelling may 
run deeper than we yet understand.
Building on earlier work (Paskey, “The Law”), this essay offers a distinctive 
account of that relationship, one rooted in the structure of legal rules. I argue that 
legal rules simultaneously have the form of a rhetorical situation, a stock story, and a 
conditional “if-then” statement, and that no form dominates the others. After elabo-
rating my thesis, I briefly consider possible implications for public discourse on the 
role of judges. An accurate and more nuanced understanding of that role calls on 
us—scholars and the public—to abandon the shopworn notion that judges do not 
“make” law. Instead, we should recognize that law and legal meaning are “made” in 
the interplay between legislatures, judges, lawyers, litigants, and the public, through a 
complex process in which storytelling is essential and inescapable.
II
On the surface, lawyers tell stories for purely practical reasons. From the standpoint 
of neurological science, “humans are hardwired to remember information delivered 
in the form of a story” (Robbins et al. 37). But on a deeper level, lawyers tell sto-
ries because storytelling is embedded in the structure of legal rules. In other words, 
the structure of law dictates that making, interpreting, and enforcing legal rules must 
necessarily involve acts of storytelling, and that the task of judging is as much about 
narrative and rhetoric as it is about logic and rules.
Thus James Boyd White was partly right when he insisted that law is “most use-
fully seen” as a “branch of rhetoric” (684). Law is also a branch of narrative: the two 
go hand in glove. To explain why this is so, I must say something about rhetoric and 
stories. But first, I will say something about the nature of legal rules.
The essential points are straightforward. At its core, law consists of rules that 
delineate duties and discretionary authority (Neumann and Entrikin 8–10). In other 
words, rules describe actions that someone must or must not take, and actions they 
may take if they wish. Those constraints are accompanied by socially-imposed con-
sequences for violating the rules and socially-created mechanisms for enacting and 
enforcing the rules. The consequences are vital—they mark the difference between 
the Ten Commandments and the Code of Hammurabi, between social norms and 
legal commands.
The Ten Commandments declare “Thou shalt not steal,” but if one does, what 
then? The text does not dictate a consequence. By contrast, the Code of Hammurabi 
provides differing penalties for different sorts of theft, some of which are quite severe: 
“If any one steal [sic] the property of a temple or of the court, he shall be put to death” 
(“Code” par. 6). The structure is that of a conditional duty: if a person does one thing, 
the sovereign’s agents shall do another.
But what, more precisely, is a legal “rule”? H. L. A. Hart distinguished between 
two types: the “primary rules of obligation” (those that govern human conduct) and 
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the secondary “rules of recognition” (those that govern how primary rules are ad-
opted, interpreted, and enforced) (97–98). The primary rules are “general rules” of 
social obligation expressed in terms that “refer to classes of people, and to classes of 
things, acts and circumstances”; by their nature, such rules “operate from a position 
of generality” and apply to more than one case (Burton 13–14; my emphasis).
It seems obvious, then, that legal rules are a template, in the sense of a preset 
format or pattern. But a format or pattern for what?
In a seminal article, Lloyd Bitzer defined a “rhetorical situation”—a situation that 
invites rhetorical discourse (6). As Bitzer framed it, the situation consists of three 
components. The first, the exigence, is a set of circumstances someone wishes to 
change. In his words, the exigence is an “imperfection”—“a defect, an obstacle, some-
thing waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be” (6). The concept is 
familiar in fairy tales: the porridge is too hot or too cold; the bed too hard or too soft.
The second component, the audience, consists of persons who can change the 
exigence and might be persuaded to do so. The capacity for intervention is critical, for 
not every exigence is rhetorical. An earthquake, however powerful, is not a rhetorical 
exigence because no audience can still the shaking.
Bitzer’s final component consists of constraints that limit an audience’s desire 
and ability to change the exigence. For a given situation, the constraints may include 
“beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, [and] motives” (8). 
As in the classical model of rhetoric, some constraints derive from the rhetor—from 
their “personal character,” “logical proofs,” and “style” (8).
Taking the components together, a rhetorical situation is one that “strongly 
invites” rhetoric as a mechanism of change. For Bitzer, a rhetorical situation has in-
trinsic meaning—a meaning that dictates a “fitting” rhetorical response. Bitzer is not 
without critics, but the critics (Vatz; Consigny) have focused on his ideas about the 
relationship between an exigence and the ensuing rhetoric, and not on the validity of 
his model itself.
The parallels between that model and legal practice are striking. Within a legal 
system, a primary rule makes an exigence rhetorical and gives it legal meaning. Each 
rule both defines an exigence and empowers an audience to change it. The rule and 
the system impose constraints, both on the audience’s ability to change the exigence 
and on the manner of rhetoric employed for that purpose. In a literal sense, a legal 
rule is a template for a rhetorical situation through which a lawyer engages in rhetoric 
on a client’s behalf.
Rhetorical discourse, then, is integral to law. But what sort of rhetoric will do? 
In Bitzer’s model, the situation itself dictates a “fitting” response. In a legal system, a 
fitting response is dictated by the customs, habits, and norms of the discourse com-
munity in which lawyers and judges perform. Appeals to legal precedent are valid; 
ad hominem attacks are not. But a fitting response is dictated also by the structure of 
primary rules, which demand that a lawyer’s rhetoric take the shape of a story. A rule 
is not only a template for a rhetorical situation—it is simultaneously a stock story, the 
pattern on which a story must be built.
Before I go further, I should clarify what I mean by narrative, story, and stock 
story. James Phelan’s definition of narrative provides a useful starting point. For some 
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theorists, a narrative is simply a representation of events in any medium (Chatman). 
But Phelan defines narrative as an act that includes a speaker, an audience, and a 
purpose: “Narrative is somebody telling somebody else on some occasion and for 
some purpose(s) that something happened” (5). A narrative, in other words, is both a 
noun and a verb: the rhetorical act of telling a story.
For legal narratives, the structuralist distinction between story and discourse is 
vital. A story consists of events and existents, including characters and setting. The 
discourse, in turn, consists of the manner and medium in which those elements are 
represented (Culler 85). To paraphrase Seymour Chatman, the story is “the what” a 
narrative depicts, the discourse “the how” (19). But legal stories are nonfictional (or 
purport to be), and a third layer must be added. A nonfictional narrative both refers 
to and is bounded by the referent, a world that exists outside the text (Cohn 12–14). 
Without this structuralist framework, it becomes difficult to talk about distinctions 
between the “brute” facts of a legal case, the differing stories a client or lawyer might 
construct from those facts, and the varying ways those stories can be presented to 
different audiences (Paskey, “Telling Refugee Stories” 482–83).
Narrative scholars have debated whether stories necessarily have a plot, but the 
concept is useful here. For E. M. Forster, a story is simply “a narrative of events ar-
ranged in time sequence” (40–42). Thus, in his view, “The king died and then the 
queen died” is a story, while “The king died, and then the queen died of grief ” is a 
plot. But as Chatman and others argue, our minds infer causation when none is pro-
vided, and that causal relationship is the difference between a story and mere descrip-
tion (Tomashevsky 66). In broad terms, a plot involves a narrative arc, a sequence of 
related rather than random events with a sense of movement. The defining trait is 
transformation, and “a resolution that marks the change as significant” (Culler 81). 
Walter Benjamin suggests that every story contains “openly or covertly, something 
useful” (86)—a moral, a proverb, advice to the reader. There is, in short, a point.
That leaves stock story, and here, Gerald Prince’s definitions of stock situation and 
stock character are useful. A stock character is a recurring character, a conventional 
type that embodies a quality or role (Prince, Dictionary 92). In 1930s burlesque, for 
instance, one such type was the “nance”—“a flamboyantly effeminate stock character 
[who] is all swish, wrist flicks, and double entendres” (Healey). Similarly, Prince de-
fines stock situation as a “standard set of states and events” that can range from the 
particular (“the birthmark that reveals kinship”) to the general (the “rags-to-riches” 
plot) (Dictionary 92). A stock story, then, is a template in which the elements—events, 
entities, and plot—are reduced to general types: a pattern for similar stories with 
common threads but differing details. In folklore, the Cinderella story is a classic 
example (Abbott 46–48).
With these definitions, what can we make of the relationship between legal rules 
and stories? Rules are not literally stories, and yet the point obscures a deeper truth. 
While rules have a logical structure, they are no less grounded in narrative, because 
every primary rule also has the structure of a stock story. A legal rule—like a stock 
story—is composed of general types, classes of people, and classes of things, acts, and 
circumstances. The rule necessarily includes stock characters and stock situations. 
And rules, like stories, have a “plot,” a transformation that is somehow significant.
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To explore the point, consider a New York statute: A person is guilty of burglary 
if he or she “knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with the intent to 
commit a crime therein” (NY Penal Law § 140.20). Like other rules, the statute refers to 
classes of people, things, acts, and circumstances. It embodies the structure of a story: 
the rule includes stock characters (the alleged burglar and a legal decision-maker) 
and stock events (the act of entering or remaining, and the judgment). There is also a 
plot: the elements are logically related by an if-then structure. Equilibrium has been 
disrupted by the commission of a crime without accountability. A conviction would 
be the resolution.
The rule links two narratives and two plots: those of the crime and of the crim-
inal. The burglary itself is something that happened to someone or something, and 
a victim who tells an account of the crime outside the courtroom has constructed 
a narrative. But that story is one in which the perpetrator goes unpunished, and it 
functions as a necessary “prequel” to the story of the trial. The criminal law thus 
attempts to continue the story of the crime and supply a new ending, one in which 
the criminal is convicted. In effect, the burglary rule, like other legal rules, empowers 
a court to change the way a nonfictional narrative will end.
If my thesis is right, then much of the criticism leveled at legal storytelling en-
tirely misses the point. I do not argue that stories are never misleading or dangerous: 
they sometimes are. But in the context of law, storytelling is neither optional nor 
secondary. One cannot teach law, study law, practice law, investigate a crime, attempt 
to comply with the law, or decide a legal dispute without telling stories. Wayne Booth 
observed that “the author cannot choose to avoid rhetoric; he can choose only the 
kind of rhetoric he will employ” (149). In the same way, lawyers, judges, and legal 
academics cannot choose to avoid telling stories; they can choose only which stories 
to tell and how to tell them.
III
At this point, a skeptical reader might ask: so what? I can only answer that how we 
think about law matters deeply—to how law is taught and practiced, to be sure, but 
also to the stories we tell about law, lawyers, and judges in the public sphere.
For over a century, American jurisprudence has been dominated by legal for-
malism and responses to formalism, especially legal realism, law and economics, and 
critical legal studies. Today, most scholars reject a strictly formalist view. And yet 
we still accept that legal reasoning is dominated by logic and determinate rules, by 
inductive and deductive reasoning. The commonplace defense of law proceeds as if 
formalism were more or less true.
Anyone who teaches first-year law students has seen this firsthand. Students 
want to be told what the rules are. They want law to be predictable. They do not want 
to hear that law is indeterminate, or that values play a larger role than they supposed. 
And with rare exceptions, they do not want to hear that storytelling is central to law. 
But that is precisely what legal practice requires. As Prince observes, narrative sup-
plies models for the transformation of reality and “mediates between the law of what 
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is and the human desire for what may be” (“On Narratology” 129). This is, of course, 
precisely what legal rules do—they provide a model by which a lawyer, through the 
rhetorical act of storytelling, seeks to transform “what is” into the client’s desire for 
“what may be.”
IV
If legal practice demands storytelling, what does that mean for the act of judging? The 
potential answers are striking.
For any courtroom dispute, a judge or jury will make two critical decisions: what 
facts have been proven, and how does the law “apply”? The application of law to fact 
lies at the core of what it means to “think” like a lawyer, and the ways we teach those 
habits of mind reflect the conventional understanding of law as a logical enterprise. 
Law school textbooks focus on inductive and deductive reasoning and on arguments 
from text and precedent, with public policy playing a lesser role. Judges use the same 
tools and techniques, but there is a different way of thinking about a judge’s task.
In an article questioning narratology’s distinction between story and discourse, 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith details the challenges inherent in cataloging versions of 
the Cinderella story, all of which are similar in some ways and different in others 
(217–18). Smith argues that the similarities are less about the “deep-plot structure” 
of the story than the conventions, habits of thought, and experiences of particular 
readers. In the context of folklore, the task of deciding whether a particular story is 
a Cinderella story ultimately rests on “some particular, but arbitrary, set of relational 
criteria” (219), and there is no authority charged with making a definitive assessment.
For all the ways in which law is different from folklore, the task of deciding how 
the law applies to a given set of facts is remarkably similar to the task of deciding 
whether a particular story is a Cinderella story, except that in the former case the 
criteria are less arbitrary and there is a definitive authority—the highest appellate 
courts. And in both situations, the task involves comparing a specific story to an 
idealized story type.
Consider again New York’s burglary statute. Under that rule, a person is guilty of 
burglary if they knowingly enter a building unlawfully with intent to commit a crime. 
Suppose a defendant shimmied into a home’s crawl space and stole copper pipes. He 
admits he is guilty of trespassing and theft, but can he be convicted of burglary, a 
more serious offense? The answer turns on whether he “entered” the house or crawled 
under it.
The outcome is neither obvious nor indisputable. In a home without a basement, 
the crawl space is the space between the ground and first floor, a space that’s typically 
enclosed but not inhabited. Though it’s too low to stand in (hence the name), a crawl 
space often contains much of the home’s utility infrastructure, including pipes for 
water and gas. And while there’s rarely direct access from a crawl space to a home’s 
interior, the space is integral to the home’s structure. Compared with other spaces 
that New York courts regard as part of a building (an enclosed porch, or a garage 
beneath a house), a crawl space is similar in some respects but different in others.
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In my hypothetical, there’s no question the defendant entered the crawl space 
and committed a crime inside it. But the stock story embedded in the burglary rule 
requires a person to enter a building, and the lawyers will argue about whether the 
defendant did so. The arguments will be grounded in logic and policy, but they will 
also attempt to persuade the audience that the defendant’s actions either do or do not 
conform to the rule’s stock story.
In ruling on the legal issue—did the defendant enter a “building”?—a judge 
would deploy the accepted rhetorical moves of legal discourse, most of which are 
grounded in logic. She would consider definitions of “enter” and “building,” review 
prior court decisions, and use analogical reasoning to compare the crawl space to 
the facts of prior cases. She might also consider the intent of the legislature and the 
broader social purpose of laws regarding burglary. I have assigned this exact problem 
to first-year law students, and I have graded them on how well they do these things.
And yet despite the obvious emphasis on logic and rhetoric, the judge’s decision 
is also an act of literary analysis in which she must compare the story before the court 
to the stock story embedded in the rule. The burglary rule defines a “genre” of crim-
inal stories, and the judge must determine whether the story told by the prosecutor 
“fits” within the genre. To do so, the judge must decide if the essential elements—the 
events and existents—of a burglary story are present. In a sense, the modes of rhetoric 
commonly employed by judges are conventions by which a judge will make decisions 
that are not only logical but literary, decisions driven by the substance and meaning 
of stories.
The trial is thus a complex, overlapping expression of the rule’s three forms: 
rhetoric, narrative, and logic. For the prosecutor, the defendant’s purported commis-
sion of a crime is both the exigence in a rhetorical situation and a story’s disruption 
of equilibrium, and a conviction is the desired resolution. For defense counsel, the 
exigence and disruption are the government’s purportedly false charges against the 
defendant, and acquittal the desired resolution. Both lawyers will tell a story con-
sistent with their rhetorical purpose, and both will ground their arguments in logic 
and underlying facts from the “world” of the case—a world they jointly construct by 
introducing evidence at trial. Thereafter, a trial judge or appeals court will likewise 
employ both narrative and logic as rhetorical tools to justify their decision.
What is true for the burglary statute is true for every primary legal rule. In a very 
real sense, the law is made of stock stories, and each primary rule specifies a genre. In 
the civil law, there are negligence stories, right of privacy stories, breach of contract 
stories, and so on. In the criminal law, there are murder stories, kidnapping stories, 
tax evasion stories, and more. For all the emphasis on logic and reason, the task that 
lawyers and judges perform when they practice law is also a literary task—one cen-
tered on telling stories, analyzing stories, and comparing stories to each other.
None of this is to say that logic is not central to law. It is. Legal rules are not 
only a template for narrative and rhetoric: they are also a template for a conditional 
statement. But the logic of law, the “if-then” character of legal rules, is not the logic 
of physics or mathematics. It is the logic of story, of consequences derived not from 
“nature” or “god,” not from the immutable traits of numbers or things in the world, 
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but from the mind of the “author”—the legislature or court—who crafted the stock 
story embedded in the rule.
In the classic syllogism about Socrates that begins “All men are mortal,” the major 
premise has a truth beyond human thought. No legislature drafted the “rules” of biol-
ogy and no legislature can repeal them. But in any legal syllogism, the major premise 
is “true” only because the law makes it so. The law has no truth outside the language 
of the law, no truth beyond the minds of those who create, interpret, and enforce the 
law. If anything, then, it is narrative that dominates, for the “if-then” structure of legal 
rules is a cultural artifact, an imperative derived from the plots of stories rather than 
from nature or mathematics.
In her recent book Forms, Caroline Levine argues that we should move beyond 
narrow attempts to define narrative texts as closed systems that simply contain the 
elements of the story (11). In that spirit, she asks: “What if we understood literary 
texts not as unified but as inevitably plural in their forms—bringing together multiple 
ordering principles, both social and literary, in ways that do not and cannot repress 
their differences?” (40). The same questions might be asked of law and legal rules.
Rules do have the structure of a conditional statement, and legal practice does 
require rhetorical acts. But to declare that rules are predominantly logical, or that 
legal practice is rhetoric, is to misstate the nature of law. As Levine suggests, no formal 
element of a text can ever manage “to contain and control the others” (40). Legal 
rules embody overlapping ordering principles. They simultaneously have the form 
of a narrative, a conditional statement, and a rhetorical situation, and the ways in 
which they operate cannot be fully understood by elevating one of those forms or 
diminishing another.
V
No one would seriously claim that judges should decide cases however they wish, 
or that legal rules mean anything a judge wants them to mean. To espouse that view 
would be contrary to the very concept of “law,” regardless of whether the state is dem-
ocratic or authoritarian. But scholars and other commentators profoundly disagree 
on where we should look for suitable constraints on law’s meaning.
In an essay defending legal formalism, Frederick Schauer emphasized that the 
text itself constrains a judge’s discretion. To varying degrees that’s true, and yet the 
limits are less definite than most citizens would suppose. Common nouns and verbs 
are categories, and their meaning is often fluid. A conviction for burglary demands 
proof that the defendant “entered” a “building,” but what, precisely, is a “building”? 
The word does not conform to the classic model of categories, because a “building” 
is not a natural kind, and there are no necessary and sufficient conditions that distin-
guish buildings from things that are not buildings. (In Florida, during a hurricane-re-
lated emergency, even a roof is optional.) Instead, whether a thing belongs to the 
category requires a complex assessment of prototypes (Rosch), family resemblances 
(Wittgenstein par. 65–71), and the use of both metaphor and metonymy (Lakoff). In 
short, the boundaries of the category are fuzzy, and there is no definitive “test.” The 
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interpretive challenge is even greater for categories that encompass our constitutional 
rights, such as “due process” or “equal protection under law.”
Against this backdrop, how should a judge decide what a statute or constitution 
means? Scholars have vigorously debated this question, and the theories can usefully 
be understood as appeals to authors, audiences, or the text itself.
For instance, one debate has centered on the distinction between purposivism 
and textualism. For purposivists, authorial intent is vital, and the text must yield to 
the author’s purpose when the two conflict (Manning 71). Textualists, in turn, argue 
that the legislative process is too opaque and complex to ascribe a single intent to 
a multi-member legislative body. As a result, textualism requires that judges treat 
the clear meaning of the text as conclusive, “even when the text fits poorly with its 
apparent background purposes” (Manning 73).
Rather than focusing on actual readers, textualist judges assess how a hypotheti-
cal reader—a “skilled, objectively-reasonable user of words” (Easterbrook 65)—would 
understand the text in the context in which it was uttered. In their view, the purposiv-
ist focus on legislative intent “disregards the central place of legislative compromise 
embedded in both the constitutional structure and the corresponding congressional 
rules of legislative procedure” (Manning 92). In effect, textualists regard the text itself 
as the only reliable source of meaning, because only the text has been ratified through 
the often-tumultuous process of enactment. Textualism is also grounded in a par-
ticular view of language: the meaning of a rule is inherent in the words of the rule 
themselves, and the task of a judge is simply to find it.
A second debate has focused on judges as authoritative readers of law and con-
tributors to a joint enterprise. Relying on an “aesthetic hypothesis” (531), Ronald 
Dworkin argues that judicial interpretation is akin to the composition of a chain 
novel written by a series of authors, in which each chapter is assigned to a different 
author in sequence. Just as each author of such a novel is bound by the choices of their 
predecessors, each judge must regard themselves as “a partner in a complex chain en-
terprise of which these innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and practices 
are the history.” A judge’s job, then, is “to continue that history into the future” while 
being constrained by it (543).
In reply, Stanley Fish suggests that Dworkin tried and failed to navigate between 
two opposing shoals, between the formalist view that “the plain meaning of the law 
[is] ‘just there,’” waiting to be found, and the legal realist view that judges simply 
“make up the meaning ‘wholesale’” according to “personal preference or whim” 
(551). For Fish, interpretation is not an activity in need of external constraint. It is, 
instead, “a structure of constraints,” one that “renders unavailable the independent or 
uninterpreted text and renders unimaginable the independent and freely interpreting 
reader” (562). The source of meaning, then, lies solely in the beliefs, assumptions, 
purposes, and practices of the interpretive community to which a reader belongs.
The theories just discussed are but a sample of the debates. At their core, they 
differ in how they construct the sources of legal meaning and the place they assign 
to authors, texts, and audiences. Textualism presumes the meaning of a text is fixed 
and objective, and ignores both authors and audience; purposivism privileges authors 
over text and audience; and Fish discounts both authors and text in favor of a com-
188  Stephen Paskey
munity of readers. But law is rhetorical—a purposeful act of communication between 
author and audience. Both authors and audiences are vital, and the text is the ground 
on which they meet. Any approach to legal interpretation that disregards any of these 
things or privileges others is fundamentally flawed.
Textualism is especially problematic in that it ignores actual authors and audi-
ences—those who make the rules, and those who are governed by them. In their 
place, textualists construct a convenient fiction, a hypothetical reader who embodies 
a set of unspoken assumptions, beliefs, and biases. In effect, textualist judges con-
sistently privilege a single, fictitious interpretive community, one whose beliefs and 
biases are for the most part their own.
Fish is right to suggest that lawyers and judges form an interpretative commu-
nity, one bound by a particular way of reading legal texts. But in a modern democratic 
state—a state grounded in the premise that its citizens consent to be governed—judges 
and lawyers are not law’s only audience, or even its most vital audience. Building on 
his description of the public sphere, Habermas argues that constitutional review must 
lend “communicative and participatory rights [. . .] a privileged position” (265). And 
so, in the act of constitutional interpretation, judges must simultaneously account for 
ways in which mass media distorts the public sphere; ensure that “divergent and mar-
ginal voices” are heard; and give full and equal representation to all “relevant groups, 
interest positions, and value orientations” (Habermas 65). In contrast to a textualist 
approach, Habermas seems to suggest that a judge should embrace all actual readers, 
should give them all a voice and seek some common thread between them. That 
approach is consistent with Habermas’s theory of discourse—a process in which all 
citizens affected by a decision have an equal voice and are free to put forward their 
views without deception or coercion.
VI
And so we come back to the public sphere, and to public discourse about the role 
judges play. The public, of course, knows little or nothing of scholarly debate about 
justice, democracy, and law. Instead, the common understanding of our legal system 
is grounded in the tropes of high school civics, in ideas about “checks and balances” 
and the separation of powers. Underlying those ideas is a deep-rooted mistrust of 
judges, and the common assertion that judges should not “make” law may be in-
tended to soothe the public’s apprehension about the power we give them.
If we understand and embrace the view that judges operate in a realm where 
language and categories are fluid, and where stories and rhetoric are no less essential 
than logic and reason, how would that change the stories we tell about judges? I have 
no definitive answer, but several points seem useful.
First, as Binder emphasizes, political representation is an effort to construct the 
public good rather than simply reflect it. As a result, law does not and cannot mimic 
the will of society or legal actors. And because law has pragmatic aims, “institutions 
with arbitrary decision-making procedures and coercive power” are inescapable, and 
“aesthetic standards such as social decency” are no less germane to evaluating law 
Narrative, Rhetoric, and the Forms of Legal Rules  189
than whether law accurately represents some notion of public will (107). Binder’s 
point is especially important given that modern democracies have not (and likely 
cannot) achieve Habermas’s ideals of full inclusion, free participation, and complete 
acceptance of both the lawmaking process and the results.
Second, as White suggests, judicial decisions should not be seen as goal-oriented 
means to an end, but as an effort to determine what law “shall mean in the language of 
the culture” (697). On a broader level, White argues that law “should take as its central 
question what kind of community we should be, with what values, motives, and aims. 
It is a process by which we make ourselves”—both individually and collectively—“by 
making our language” (698).
In the end, our recognition that storytelling is central to law calls on us to un-
derstand and accept that even in a modern democracy, judges necessarily have more 
power and discretion than we would wish. It further requires us to recognize that our 
political system is not simply a system of checks and balances, but also one of con-
scious and inescapable collaboration, in which legislators and judges jointly “make” 
the law, with input from lawyers, litigants, and the public. Legislators make law by 
choosing words; judges by giving those words authoritative legal meaning. And that 
understanding, if truly endorsed, must necessarily alter our expectations for judges, 
the stories we tell about judges in the public sphere, the traits we seek when we choose 
judges, and perhaps even the processes by which we choose them and the duration 
of their tenure.
During a ceremony at the University at Buffalo on August 26, 2019, Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsberg was asked to name the essential traits of a judge. She offered three: 
patience, compassion, and a willingness to listen and learn. Other traits are useful 
and necessary, but those traits seem fitting in this context. As Paul Gewirtz explains, 
“literature makes its special claims upon us precisely because it nourishes the kinds 
of human understanding not achievable through reason alone but often involving 
intuition and feeling as well” (1050).
We should ask no less from our judges. When all has been said and done, what 
is it that judges do, if not decide how real-life stories should end? And if the text itself 
provides an imperfect guide, where else should we seek a fitting interpretation of 
legal rules if not in a judge’s willingness to consider not only the law’s authors and 
varied audiences, not only all “sides” of the story, but also the alternate stories told by 
divergent and marginalized voices?
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